We present evidence that ethnic fragmentation explains variations in per capita income, institutions, and schooling better than income inequality. To do so, we identify instruments for ethnic fractionalization and income inequality based on historical experience and geography. Using instrumental variables estimation, we find that ethnic fractionalization explains the level of income both when income inequality is included as a control in the estimation and when it is not. However, we find inconsistent evidence that income inequality affects development when ethnic fractionalization is properly treated as an endogenous variable. If anything, the evidence we have suggests that income inequality is positively related to economic development.
Introduction
A large literature finds a role for income inequality in affecting economic development both in the presence of credit market imperfections and without. The channels through which income inequality have been posited to work are numerous. For example, in a seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that inequality can affect human capital accumulation--and, therefore, growth--in the presence of credit market imperfections. Galor and Moav (2004) extend this idea by arguing that inequality can be harmful in earlier stages of development when large investments in physical capital are primary drivers of growth but that the effects observed in Galor and Zeira (1993) may dominate later on. Moreover, Persson and Tabellini (1994) show how inequality can affect physical capital accumulation via a demand for redistributive policies, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that inequality affects physical capital investment through its effect on political instability, and Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrate a role for income inequality in affecting occupational choice and the extent of entrepreneurship. Others have linked inequality to the development of low quality institutions as the political elite block institutional reform that would benefit the country as a whole but challenge their own dominance (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000) . 1 At the same time, others have focused on the negative impact of a related but different aspect of societal division-ethnic fractionalization. Easterly and Levine (1997) show the negative consequences of ethnic diversity while paying particular attention to African development and argue that fractionalization interferes with the provision of growth promoting public goods. Others have confirmed the consequences of ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Alesina et. al. 2003) , but Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) argue that ethnic diversity only has negative consequences in democracies where the lack of ability to coordinate across different ethnic groups may have more severe consequences. Importantly for our work, Alesina et al (2003) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) also argue that ethnic diversity is endogenous and careful examinations of the role of ethnic diversity in affecting economic outcomes must take that into account. Ashraf and Galor (forthcoming) argue that genetic diversity can be beneficial at intermediate levels by spurring faster innovation but that the negative effects discussed here take over at higher levels, creating a U-shaped pattern.
In addition, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) argue that ethnic diversity may have also played a role in the development of institutions by allowing the elites to readily identify a group that could be excluded from privileges such as landholding or suffrage. Thus, ethnic fractionalization may have negative impacts on development independent of the level of economic inequality. Indeed, their work highlights two potential roles of ethnicity in political development: it can be a tool for identification or a potential ideological fault line. Thus, a priori, it is unclear whether ethnic differences or income inequality are both playing independent roles in long run development.
In spite of a strong theoretical foundation for the effects of inequality on development, robust empirical evidence has been difficult to find. Clarke (1995) and Deininger and Squire (1998) find evidence that inequal ity is harmful for growth. Forbes (2000) finds that inequality has a positive effect on growth while Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find an inverted U relationship between growth rates and changes in the income distribution. Furthermore, they argue that it is difficult to interpret any of these correlations causally because of difficult identification problems. In an effort to address the identification issue, Easterly (2001a Easterly ( , 2007 uses characteristics of the land that might support plantationbased economies as instruments for inequality. He concludes that inequality is associated with lower levels of income, schooling and quality of institutions. Importantly, Easterly (2007) uses a variety of control variables, including ethnic fractionalization (treated as an exogenous variable) to demonstrate that income inequality is a robust determinant of the level of income per capita.
In contrast to the empirical literature relating income inequality to development, there is less debate about the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization, at least in certain circumstances.
The vast majority of this literature, however, treats fractionalization as exogenous. While treating ethnic fractionalization as exogenous may be an appropriate specification in classic growth regressions spanning 30 or so years, it is less acceptable over the longer time spans implicit in income level regressions (Alesina et al, 2003) . Specifically, most migration occurs into those countries with higher levels of economic and institutional development, implying that OLS coefficients will underestimate the negative impacts of ethnic diversity (Mayda, 2005; Freeman, 2006) . Moreover, ethnic diversity may hinder the development of institutions and provisions of public goods while countries are in the early stages of development, but have a smaller (or non-existent) negative impact once the institutions of democracy and rule of law have been implemented (e.g. Easterly, 2001b). Finally, a somewhat distinct literature demonstrates how national boundaries may be endogenous, which could create reverse causality between fractionalization and income per capita (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg, 2005) .
Recently, however, the treatment of ethnic fractionalization as an exogenous variable has begun to change. Michalopoulos (forthcoming) uses geographic variation to identify causes of fractionalization but does not relate fractionalization to income per capita. Similarly, Ahlerup and Olsson (forthcoming) appeal to an evolutionary framework, showing that ethnic fractionalization is positively related to an indicator of the duration of human settlement. Ahlerup (2010) directly addresses the endogeneity issue by treating fractionalization as endogenous when estimating its effects on income per capita and uses this framework to compare the effects of fractionalization and property rights institutions when both are treated as endogenous. His work does not, however, investigate the role of income inequality. In related work, Ashraf and Galor (forthcoming) use migratory distance from the location of human origins to predict genetic diversity and demonstrates an inverted U relationship between genetic diversity and income per capita.
We build on recent work by Putterman and Weil (2010) and Ahlerup and Olsson (forthcoming) on the historical determinants of inequality and ethnic fractionalization that identifies suitable instruments for examining the relative roles of ethnic fractionalization and income inequality. We find that ethnic fragmentation is an important determinant of per capita income, school enrollment and institutional quality. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, when income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are simultaneously added as endogenous variables in such regressions, ethnic diversity has a negative and significant effect while income inequality enters with a positive and usually statistically insignificant effect. These results are robust to numerous controls and different estimation strategies. The results also clearly indicate that fractionalization must be treated as an endogenous variable.
Our results are important because, although income inequality and ethnic fractionalization may be correlated empirically, the channels through which ethnic fractionalization affect economic development may be different than those through which income inequality affects economic growth.
There are policy implications to this finding as well: the best policy to remedy the deleterious effects of ethnic fractionalization may be very different from one aimed at alleviating the effects of income inequality.
To the extent that ethnic fractionalization is a cause of income inequality or perhaps tells us something about the nature of the inequality, our results suggest that there are certain types of inequality that are worse for economic development than others. In other words, our results are consistent with the idea that inequality that is perpetuated by ethnic divisions may be particularly bad for economic growth. In that sense, to the extent that ethnic fractionalization affects growth via political or institutional channels rather than via factor accumulation, our findings complement those who argue that political inequality may lead to instability or lack of cohesion which lowers growth (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Rodrik, 1999; Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock, 2006) . Also, our findings are consistent with the arguments in the strand of the inequality and growth literature that links inequality to the development of low quality institutions if exploiting ethnic divisions is a way for the elite to maintain their economic and political power when faced with growing domestic agitation for equal rights or when balancing inconsistencies inherent in arguing for freedom from colonizing powers while promoting the continuance of slavery (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000) .
Empirical Results
Our goal is to show that ethnic fractionalization and associated levels of inequality better explain poor growth performance than income inequality in general. To provide convincing empirical results, we will base our specifications on earlier empirical work demonstrating the link between inequality and growth (Easterly, 2001a (Easterly, , 2007 . As mentioned in the introduction, our contention is that the forces that led to inequality also led to ethnic fractionalization. In particular, earlier literature attempts to identify geographic instruments that lead to inequality by providing incentives to develop plantations, which bred both inequality and ethnic divisions. Our departure from previous literature, which leads us to different conclusions, is that we will treat both fractionalization and inequality as endogenous variables.
Treating Fractionalization as an Endogenous Variable
We start by showing that previous results about the effect of inequality are not robust to treating ethnic fractionalization as endogenous. As mentioned above, Easterly (2007) uses land quality as an instrument for income inequality, treating ethnic fractionalization as exogenous. However, we show that, in addition to predicting income inequality, land quality also predicts ethnic fractionalization. The instrument used by Easterly (2007) is the likelihood that a country would export sugar or wheat.
Specifically, the variable, LWHEATSUGAR, is defined as log (1+area of land suitable for growing wheat/1+area of land suitable for growing sugar). This data originally comes from the United Nations' Both are averaged over the period of 1960-1998 in order reduce measurement error and are adjusted to account for biases introduced by different survey measurement techniques. Summary statistics, data descriptions and sources are provided for all the variables used in the paper in Appendix Table 1 .
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 replicate the Easterly (2007) results for income inequality and
Column 3 of Table 1 shows that we obtain similar results when we use LWHEATSUGAR to predict ethnic fractionalization. 2 We show this point by presenting the estimation results of the effects of fractionalization and inequality when land quality is used as an instrument for each in separate regressions in Panel A of Table 2 . Columns 1 and 4 present results when the Gini coefficient and the income share of the top 20 percent are used as measures of inequality and the dependent variable is the log of per capita income in
2002.
The measure of fractionalization, originally from Alesina et al (2003) , is the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals will be from different ethno-linguistic groups. The results in Table 1 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in LWHEATSUGAR decreases fractionalization, income share and the Gini coefficient by .37, .44, and .41 standard deviations respectively. The R-squared values for each simple regression in Table 1 are similar and, given the theoretical reasons to link land quality to both income inequality and ethnic fractionalization, this suggests that land quality may be just as good an instrument for ethnic fractionalization as it is for income inequality. 3 As mentioned earlier, two ways in which inequality and fractionalization have been hypothesized to affect growth is via the accumulation of human capital or via the development of institutions. To see if there is evidence for these channels in our data we also report similar regressions in Table 2 , using a measure of human capital accumulation and institution quality. So our results can be comparable to the previous literature we again use the same variables employed by Easterly (2007), GOVERNANCE, an aggregate measure of institutional quality from Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) and secondary school enrollment rates averaged from 1998-2002 (SCHOOL). These results appear in These results replicate those in Easterly (2007) . However, in column 7 we report results when we substitute fractionalization for inequality and find that fractionalization also has the expected negative effect on income per capita. 2 We initially use the same sample as Easterly (2007) to show that our results are not due to a change in sample. Later, we are able to expand the sample. 3 We use the log of income per capita in 2002 so that our results can be directly compared to those in Easterly (2007) . the remaining columns of Table 2 and show that in all cases, both inequality and fractionalization are significantly and negatively associated with institutional quality and schooling enrollments.
In Panel B of Table 2 , we repeat the estimations results after adding the share of arable land in the tropics (tropical) as a second instrument in order test the over identification restrictions. Again, the explanatory variable is significant at the 1% level in all nine regressions and, more importantly, fractionalization passes the overidentification test in all three regressions, implying that the tests fails to reject the null hypothesis that LWHEATSUGAR and tropical affect the dependent variables through channels other than ethnic division. Importantly, diagnostic tests indicate that both inequality and fractionalization are endogenous. The test of endogeneity, which is in the last row of Table 2, is the difference between the Sargan-Hansen statistics when treating the potentially endogenous regressor as endogenous and exogenous. The null hypothesis is that the variable can be treated as exogenous and, in all specifications, this null hypothesis is soundly rejected for both inequality and fractionalization.
So, we have found that ethnic fractionalization and income inequality present equally plausible explanations for why the historical experience of countries as "plantation economies" is associated with slower growth than that experienced by their counterparts. Easterly (2007) demonstrates that his results for income inequality are robust to number of control variables, including commodity exporting indicator variable, the share of arable land in the tropics, legal heritage and continent dummies. We do not replicate his results in order to conserve space but do show similar estimations when ethnic fractionalization is treated as the endogenous variable. These results are in Table 3 . In 11 of the 12 specifications, ethnic fractionalization is significant at the 5% level or better. When using income per capita as the dependent variable and adding tropical as a control, FRAC is significant at the 10% level (p-value of .06). Once again, diagnostic tests indicate that fractionalization should be treated as endogenous.
The "Horserace"
Because both fractionalization and income inequality appear to be important determinants of long-run development when investigated separately, we now enter them simultaneously into instrumental variables regressions. This "horserace" technique allows us to determine which variable exerts a greater effect and is similar to the approach taken by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Rodrik Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) , and Easterly and Levine (2003) who attempt to determine the relative importance of competing factors that could influence growth. As we noted earlier, the two variables are correlated and the reason for similar results when using each one separately may be that one is proxying for the other. Of course, to employ a valid estimation technique, it is beneficial to have one instrument that predicts income inequality, but not ethnic fractionalization and one instrument that predicts fractionalization but not inequality.
Fortunately, recent literature on the historical determinants of current inequality and fractionalization provides us with such instruments. Putterman and Weil (2010) show that the standard deviation of state history (heterogeneity in the early development of the current population's ancestors)
is related to current day income inequality. 4 We use this as an instrument for income inequality (in addition to the mean of adjusted state history as a control). To instrument for ethnic fractionalization, we rely on geographic features of the country, specifically, the natural logs of distance to a coast or a river and the absolute value of latitude. Ahlerup and Olsson (forthcoming) also use these geographic features as determinants of ethnic fractionalization. They argue that latitude is related to climatic variability, habitat diversity, and pathogen loads, which affect a local population's reach and migration, with greater variability encouraging the population to spread out more geographically and more pathogen's limiting migration in and out of a region. In addition, they suggest that populations that are closer to the coast or other waterways are less isolated and will be less fractionalized. 5 We use both distance to coast or river and latitude as instruments for fractionalization. 6
As we explain below, although so far we have employed Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) so that our results are comparable to previous literature, we will perform subsequent instrumental variables estimation using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). Although this is a single equation technique, we can write the structural model as follows: (2010). Consistent with our reasoning above, we expect β 13, β 23 , and β 24 to be equal to zero. Control variables in the estimation include regional dummy variables and dummy variables for legal heritage. As noted earlier in our discussion of Table 3 , Easterly also controls for share of arable land in a tropical location and a commodity exporting dummy. We do not report these as part of our main specification because these variables do not enter the estimations significantly and their inclusion does not alter our qualitative conclusions. 6 Our use of absolute value of latitude is similar to Easterly's use of the share of tropical land. We prefer to use latitude in our main specifications because it varies over a wide range of countries and is used in Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) Although LIML is a single equation technique, we can still verify the expected relationships between inequality, fractionalization and the instruments described above. Results from the reduced form estimates of inequality and fractionalization are in Table 4 . The first three columns examine the determinants of fractionalization, the middle three columns examine the Gini coefficients, and the last three columns present results for the income share of the richest quintile. These results are in line with the expectations we outlined above. The standard deviation of state history is a positive and statistically significant predictor of both measures of inequality, but not consistently of ethnic fractionalization.
Conversely, the natural log of the distance to a coast or river and of the absolute value of latitude are significant predictors of ethnic fractionalization, but not consistent predictors of income inequality.
We report the results of our LIML estimations in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5 , the measure of income inequality used is the Gini coefficient. In Table 6 , the income share of the top 20% is used.
Prior to examining the main results, we first examine further specification tests that assure us of the validity of our estimation strategy. Specifically, in the bottom rows of Tables 5 and 6, we report several tests of underidentification and weak identification that support our efforts to separately identify the effects of inequality and fractionalization. The AP F-statistic is the Angrist-Pischke (2009) test of weak instruments based on LIML size, we find that in all but two specifications in Table 5 , at the 5 percent significance level, the maximum size of the Wald test is less than .15, indicating that our estimation does not suffer from weak instruments. 9 To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the strength of our instruments, we also report the Shea's Partial R 2 for each of the endogenous variables in the first stage regressions. The adjusted Shea's partial R 2 takes into account the correlation between the instruments. Although there is much variation in each of these regressions that is unexplained, they do suggest that each endogenous variable can be separately identified with these instruments. Finally, Table 5 reports the results of a test of overidentifying restrictions, OIR, providing another measure of the validity of our instruments. 10 We turn now to interpreting the main results of our instrumental variables estimation in Table 5 .
The first three columns examine income per capita, while the remaining six columns examine determinants of income per capita that may be influenced by inequality or fractionalization. Focusing first on the results for income per capita, we see that fractionalization has a strong negative effect on income per capita, while inequality actually has a positive effect that is statistically significant at the five percent level. These results show a meaningful role for fractionalization in determining income. For example, the results in column 1 predict that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization (.25)
The results of all of these tests are particularly important in our context because we have two endogenous variables and the instruments may be correlated. However, in sum, these diagnostic results suggest that our instruments are valid for identifying separate effects of inequality and fractionalization.
would generate a 1.9 decrease in the log of GDP per capita. To determine if our results may be affected by omitted variables, we add legal heritage and continent dummies, the same control variables used by
Easterly (2007), in columns 2 and 3. The magnitude of the coefficient for fractionalization decreases, but remains negative and significant at the one percent level. In contrast, the results for the Gini coefficient in the first three columns of Table 5 suggest that income inequality actually has a positive effect on income per capita.
The remaining columns of Table 5 examine the determinants of two variables through which income inequality or fractionalization may affect income per capita. In columns four through six, we report results of the estimation of the Kaufman, Kraay and Ziobo (2002) measure of good governance.
As mentioned above, both income inequality and ethnic fractionalization have been theoretically linked to the development of weak institutions and poor governance. Our results find support for a negative link between fractionalization and poor governance, but we do not find evidence of the link between inequality and governance. This result is potentially important as it calls into question theories that link income inequality and weak institutions (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997 Sokoloff, , 2000 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) . Our results suggest that it may be more appropriate to refine these theories to explicitly include elites that are identified by their membership in specific ethnic groups and not solely based on an income class. In columns seven through nine, we report estimation results for secondary school enrollments. Parallel to the results for income per capita, we find that income inequality is associated with higher enrollment rates and fractionalization is associated with significantly lower. The magnitude of the estimated effects of fractionalization are potentially devastating to economic development: the results in column 7 predict that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization (.25) would decrease secondary school enrollment rates by 54 percentage points. As above, these results suggest that theories of access to education should specifically address membership in ethnic groups.
In Table 6 , we replicate the Table 5 results using income share of the top quintile instead of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. The conclusions from these alternative estimations are broadly consistent with those in Table 5 ; however, we are not as confident in our identification strategy when we use income share of the rich as the measure of inequality. Specifically, the Kleibergen-Paap statistic does not allow us to reject a maximum size of the Wald test as high as .20 in most specifications; therefore, we cannot conclude that this specification does not suffer from weak instruments. The difference in the two specifications, of course, is the measure of inequality and these results suggest that the standard deviation of state history is a better instrument for the Gini coefficient than for the share of income of the top quintile. Given that the standard deviation of state history applies to the entire population and that the Gini coefficient measures income inequality throughout the entire distribution while the income share of the top 20 percent only examines part of the distribution, this finding appears reasonable. Going forward, we will focus our analysis with the use of the Gini coefficient as the measure of income inequality. Nonetheless, the results we have obtained so far suggest that fractionalization is negatively associated with income, good governance, and secondary school enrollment rates. In contrast, income inequality is either positively related to these indicators of development or not related in a statistically significant way.
Why are our results different from those found by previous authors? The main difference in our approach is that we treat ethnic fractionalization as an endogenous variable in the estimation of income per capita. As we argued earlier, changes in income per capita can induce migration over the long-run which would affect the ethnic diversity of a country's population. If high incomes induced migration, treating ethnic diversity as exogenous causes the coefficient on ethnic diversity to be biased upwards, counteracting the hypothesized negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on income.
Fractionalization and Good Governance
To gain more insight into the ways in which inequality and fractionalization affect economic development, we provide more detailed results on the determination of specific aspects of good governance that comprise the overall Kaufman, Kraay and Ziobo (2002) measure. Results reported in Table 7 examine individual governance indicators: measures of "voice and accountability" (VOICE), "political stability" (STABILITY), "government efficiency" (GOVEFFECT), "regulation quality" (REGQUAL), "rule of law" (RULELAW) and "corruption" (CORRUPT). Fractionalization enters negatively and significantly in all 18 specifications, suggesting that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on all of the different aspects of "good governance" comprising the aggregate index. The estimation method used in Table 7 treats both fractionalization and inequality as endogenous in the determination of governance. This would be the case if good governance affects migration and therefore ethnic diversity and if governance affects income distribution. Both are plausible scenarios and, in fact, the tests for endogeneity (bottom rows of Table 9 ) indicate that the null hypothesis of exogenous fractionalization can be rejected at the 5% level in the majority of specifications. The null hypothesis for the Gini coefficient can be rejected in several, but fewer, specifications. Interestingly, income inequality is only statistically significant in one of these estimations and always estimated with a positive coefficient, suggesting that, after controlling for fractionalization, income inequality does not have a robust effect on governance.
Discussion
While this paper has focused on comparing the effects of inequality and ethnic fractionalization, we view our results as complementary to the growing literature on the effects of income inequality (e.g.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000; Easterly, 2007) . Recent literature focuses on how inequality prevents the emergence of political systems that provide basic market-supporting institutions and public goods. The idea is that elites resist such institutions because they will allow the majority of the population to challenge their privileged position. Thus, the economic elites use their power to protect their own position at the expense of total economic growth.
A long literature on ethnic fractionalization suggests similar outcomes emerging through similar but distinct mechanisms. Specifically, different factions struggle to ensure that the allocation of government resources disproportionately benefit their own side. This struggle prevents countries from solving collective action problems and undercuts the validity and effectiveness of existing government institutions by spurring (in reality or perception) ethnic groups to use them in a partial manner. Thus, inequality prevents the emergence of high quality institutions because the people who control the development of their own political and economic institutions do not want to allow others to close the gap by improving their own position. Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, leads to a struggle between competing factions that can cause worse economic outcomes even if one group does not have complete control over the governmental resources. As in the inequality literature, the importance of ethnic diversity in long-run development works by interfering with the development of appropriate marketsupporting institutions and the provision of public goods.
We provide evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a greater effect on economic development than income inequality. Although when the endogeneity of fractionalization is not considered, income inequality is associated with negative development outcomes, high income inequality is not a sufficient condition to lead to worse economic outcomes. In addition to showing that ethnic fractionalization affects the level of income, we also show that it affects investment in schooling. In our estimations, ethnic fractionalization has a strong negative effect on secondary school enrollment rates, while inequality has an insignificant and often positive impact. This result challenges the notion that elites will simply restrict access to public goods in order to maintain their privileged position. There are several reasons why elites may not block access to public education based simply on income differences. First, income differences could be insufficient motivation for a person to be willing to view the success of their group or (or himself) separately from the success of a country as a whole. Second, elites may simply lack the power to restrict public good provisions based on income. Finally, recent work in Unified Growth Theory argues that elites (or at least some portion of elites) benefit from having a more well-educated public (Galor and Moav, 2006; Galor, 2005; Golar, Moav and Vollrath, 2009 ). Instead, the results confirm the notion that ethnic differences prevent societies from overcoming the collective action problems inherent in providing public goods.
Another set of results suggests that ethnic fractionalization also effects income via the development of institutional quality. As above, we don't find that income inequality in general consistently affects institutions in a statistically significant way. The results for ethnic fractionalization, however, show many signs of persistent conflict in the development of effective institutions. These struggles manifest themselves in high levels of corruption and regulatory interference in the market and inefficient provision of services by the government bureaucracy and justice systems, all of which could results from ethnic groups attempting to use the government to extract rents from opposing segments of society. Similarly, lower scores on the "voice and accountability" measure could be the result of entrenched ethnic interests preventing real electoral competition. Finally, the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and "political stability and violence" is likely a response of the inability of diverse societies to mediate problems through established political channels.
Conclusion
We provide evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is better able to explain differences in income levels, school enrollment rates, and institutional quality than income inequality. Our results suggest that the nature of divisions in society may be particularly important in determining the effects of inequality on development.
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